A feature setting nonprofit governance and management apart from the same functions in the private and public sectors is the unique interplay between volunteers and paid staff. This interplay, while critically important in many ways, takes on particular significance during episodes when volunteers, acting as members of the board of directors of a nonprofit, must play out their most basic governance responsibility, that of hiring the nonprofit executive. This necessity can occur at the point when an organization first outgrows the ability of volunteers to carry out the work, when a sitting executive decides voluntarily to resign or retire, or when the involuntary removal of an executive is called for. It requires that volunteer members of the board take action.

There has come to be a great deal written about the nonprofit sector, but the study of its operations is still in its infancy. Regarding nonprofit governance Ostrower and Stone note that Middleton’s 1987 assessment found little literature. Their 2001 update reveals a growing body of work, but notes that “major gaps in our theoretical and empirical knowledge about boards continue to exist” (p. 2).

In terms of the general nonprofit literature one feature out of the evolution of the American nonprofit sector that bears mentioning here is the role of volunteers. In the cycle of development of many nonprofits the first board of directors may include a charismatic and energetic volunteer founder and others who share a missionary zeal for
impacting a particular need. At some point tasks of the organization become too much for volunteer board members and other individuals are employed to carry out this work. The lines between board and staff remain intertwined for a time, but gradually differentiate themselves (Ostrowski, 1990). From this point on, regardless of the size and scope of the nonprofit organization, the relationship between the board and the staff - particularly between the board and the chief executive officer – becomes one of the most critical determinants of organizational survival and of organizational success, however that is defined.

It is generally accepted that nonprofit CEOs who are most effective are those who lead assertively and are willing to take risks to overcome obstacles like the free rider elements of consumption, the nondistribution constraint, and the lack of financial incentives to hire and motivate staff (Young, 1987). Where nonprofit organizations are seen as successful (by whatever set of criteria that is judged), the potential conflict within the highly complex and multi-layered relationship between CEO and board chair has been minimized, most often by CEOs who aggressively manage the relationship. There seems to be some agreement that the CEOs are *de facto* leaders of the board/staff relationship, regardless of the fact that the CEO is hired by and reports to the board (Herman and Heimovics, 1991; Fletcher, 1992; Middleton, 1987; Murray, Bradshaw and Wolbin, 1992).

If this conclusion - that effective nonprofit leadership equals strong CEO leadership of the board - is assumed to be correct an interesting question arises in the one instance when board action presumably must be self-driven. The transition from one CEO to another would seem to demand at least formal and at least temporary board
dominance of the relationship between the two entities (Wood, 1992). If the natural order of things in successful nonprofits is for the CEO to lead the board, how do nonprofit organizations proceed when there is transition of that leader? In what ways do boards of directors gather themselves to practice their ultimate ownership of the governance function separate from the leadership of the CEO being replaced?

Empirical exploration of this process, as opposed to didactic how-to manuals, is virtually nonexistent. Austin and Gilmore (1993) hypothesize that this is the case because executive replacement is a temporary and fleeting phenomenon and because access to the principals involved may be difficult to obtain. Vancil (1987) verifies that this is a process that happens out of the public eye in the corporate sector as well. As a board moves from its normal operating pattern to whatever level and kind of activity is necessary to replace its CEO it is understandable that participation in research may not be on the top of its agenda. Similarly, a CEO going through either a positive or negative transition may have priorities in mind other than expanding the knowledge pool. In spite of these challenges and the lack of basic empirical data on which to build, the subject of nonprofit board activity during executive transition is worthy of study in its own right and in order to inform about how boards of directors and CEOs interact in other ways to carry out the nonprofit governance function.

Research Method

The purpose of this study was to gain information about how uncompensated volunteers take on and carry out the task of selecting and hiring a high level employee who will become for all practical purposes their leader. A major research assumption
was that an inductive qualitative study, through which the experience of those involved in managing such processes is probed, would lead most directly to potential theory about the matter. Questions to be asked were open-ended and dealt with events that had occurred in the past rather than variables that could be manipulated by the researcher. The fact that board activity during CEO transition may itself be a discovery process further justified a study methodology following the same varied route.

Several assumptions guided the work of this study:

1. The division of task responsibility between board and CEO in nonprofit organizations is variable depending on what is happening in the organization.
2. Board behavior changes significantly during transition of the CEO.
3. CEO transition during different points in the organizational life cycle creates different kinds of board behaviors.
4. The principals most able to shed light on how this process occurs include board chairs and other board members, nonprofit CEOs themselves, and senior staff in nonprofit organizations undergoing transition.

The working hypothesis for the study was that board behavior and operation change and become dominant during executive transition such that, at minimum, the board carries out the primary function of engaging a successor. Subsidiary questions evolving from the hypothesis included the following:

1. How are board behaviors perceived by the principals before transition begins?
2. How are changes in board behavior experienced and perceived by the various principals involved (outgoing CEO, board members, senior staff)?
3. At what point do changes in board behavior occur and why?
4. How do circumstances precipitating the transition affect changes in board behavior?

Study Sample

It was decided that a small number of case studies carried out in relative depth could be expected to yield richer data than numerous cases considered more superficially. Reflecting this decision a purposive sample of four organizations representing different points in the organizational life cycle as outlined by Quinn and Cameron (1983) was selected. Because of the sensitivity of the topic in all cases the names of and certain identifying features about each organization were masked.

Data collection was carried out through interviews and document reviews. Twenty-four interviews were conducted using an informal conversational technique, as described by Patton (1987). Informants included in all cases the board chair at the time of the transition, the current board chair, the newly hired CEO, and at least one senior staff person who worked at the organization during the transition; in three cases the former CEO and a board chair not directly involved in the transition process were interviewed; in one case the board member who had chaired the search was interviewed.

Requests for participation were made to current CEOs of six nonprofit organizations and two declined. One cited a tragedy that had precipitated the previous CEOs departure and his unwillingness to reopen painful topics. The second, even though he was happy to have been selected, believed his board had conducted a seriously flawed process, and did not wish it discussed with an outsider. Four CEOs were willing to have their organization’s processes studied on the condition of anonymity of agency and
individuals. Those CEOs determined access to other individuals, none of whom declined to be interviewed.

The general interview guide consisted mainly of one open-ended question: *Tell the story of the transition process from the time that it was first known to you that transition would occur until a new CEO was in place.* Probing questions were used to gain an understanding of dynamics such as frequency, quality and manner of communications prior to and during transition, parties initiating action prior to and during transition, and decision-making strategies prior to and during transition.

Interviews were supplemented by a review of documents intended to describe the organizations in terms of mission, size, history, constituencies, and primary sources of support. These included such items as newsletters, annual reports, IRS Form 990s and organization web-sites.

Since the purpose of the study was primarily descriptive the general strategy for analyzing data was to construct a framework for surfacing common themes that came to light across informants for a given organization. While there was variation in the stories told about a given organization, depending on the role, vantage point and degree of involvement of the informant, in all four cases each informant gave the appearance of trying to give an accurate account as she or he remembered details, rather than attempting to be self-serving or critical of others.

This strategy was followed by a comparison of accounts across organizations of all those individuals filling a particular role and an examination of these accounts for convergence and divergence of perspective regarding four areas: the CEO’s departure, the process of the search for a successor, the selection itself and the transition period.
Findings

Participating Organizations

Metro Syndrome Society (MSS)

The story of the Metro Syndrome Society (MSS) involved the transition from the founder/executive director to her successor. MSS had grown in the two decades of its existence into a strong, viable organization fulfilling a critical role in its community and enjoying the reputation of highly credible service provider.

In 1996 the founder was discovered to have a very serious illness. At first classic treatment leading to a positive outcome seemed possible. Within months, however, the disease had reoccurred and worsened. The prognosis became extremely grim, with death presented as a very real probability within three to six months. The founder elected to undergo radical experimental treatment. Her recovery was arduous and there were numerous reoccurrences and setbacks.

Having kept her condition private as long as the disease seemed manageable, with the more serious diagnosis in early 1999 it was necessary for the founder to confide in the board and staff leadership. They made the decision that a successor had to be named and, under these trying conditions, initiated a search. A very capable and experienced candidate was hired shortly with the understanding that she would begin employment as soon as practicable, assisting the founder in the running of the organization as long as her health permitted and assuming the executive director position when the apparently inevitable worsening of the founder’s condition made it impossible for her to carry on.

Even before the new person actually came on board the tide in the founder’s health status began to turn. The experimental treatment appeared to have been successful
after all. She was eventually pronounced free of the disease and the imminent threat of
disability and even death was over.

MSS now faced the unusual dilemma of having two highly qualified, highly
compensated leaders, one the founder who was no longer interested in fully giving up the
reins, and the other, an individual who had been promised the top job within a reasonable
amount of time. Difficulties were evident, but before the situation became untenable the
founder was offered an attractive national position and she decided to accept it, creating a
serendipitous positive solution to a very complicated problem.

The MSS situation drew very high emotion from each informant. Even though
the period following her apparent recovery was difficult for both her and her successor
and each wished the other had behaved differently at times, there was more poignancy
than animosity in their own telling of the story. There was additional drama involved
because of very close board relationships that existed with the CEO presumed for a time
to be dying. At some point there was board division about how to handle the ensuring
duality of leadership and several principals felt that the search committee chair was the
one individual who took the brunt of the fall-out around the challenging situation.

State Eldercare Consortium (SEC)

State Eldercare Consortium can be loosely described as a statewide nonprofit
trade organization whose membership is made up of organizations that provide services
to dependant senior citizens. SEC’s staff consists of only an executive director and an
administrative assistant/office manager. It is governed by a board made up of CEOs of
member agencies, each of whom him/herself reports to a nonprofit board of directors.
In late 2001 several members of the SEC board started the day with phone calls from one of their number who had read an item in the local newspaper noting that the current SEC CEO had been indicted for embezzling money from a family member. Each individual went through his or her own feelings of disbelief before coming to the common conclusion that there was no doubt that the person under indictment was indeed their executive, whom most also considered to be a friend.

The board acted quickly to suspend the CEO and to take measures to secure the organization’s assets, believing at first that the situation was an entirely personal one. A fraud audit eventually revealed that, in fact, there had also been inappropriate activity in the CEO’s handling of the Consortium’s funds, although this was to a fairly limited degree.

Since the CEO had pled guilty the board’s immediate suspension turned quickly into a termination and the realization that a search for a successor must begin as soon as possible. Fortuitously a former high level state administrator had begun to tire of the amount of travel required by her current position as consultant for a national senior citizen advocacy organization. This individual was known to and highly regarded by almost all of the SEC membership, as well as by her former colleagues in state government and the legislature. While she did not originally apply for the position on her own she was recruited by the search committee chair with the encouragement of board leadership and, eventually, she accepted the position.

A common theme among all accounts was a feeling of professional and also personal betrayal, although all agreed that SEC emerged a stronger organization with a better leader following the transition.
Human Services Mission (HSM)

Founded in 1983 by a crusading community volunteer Human Service Mission (HSM) was determined from the outset to be more than a shelter for the homeless. As an organization it is one unit of a large faith-based system of charitable organizations, although its history and community prominence allow it to operate with a high degree of autonomy.

After a decade the charismatic founder and CEO left the organization to join her husband, recently transferred to another city. She was followed by a local nonprofit executive who lasted barely more than a year before being terminated by the board without a replacement named.

While a search was launched for a successor a board member and former corporate executive was asked to fill in. Eventually the search was called off as the board member seemed to be doing a very good job. When that individual retired the board chair approached still another retired board member and asked him to take on the role. He agreed to become CEO on a temporary basis not to exceed three years.

After a little more than a year this person decided that he had accomplished his objectives and wanted to return to his retirement pursuits. As the search got underway the board chair happened to attend a fund-raising event where he heard a well-known local sports figure give a spiritual testimonial before announcing that he was leaving sports to pursue a direction in which he could better live out his faith. The board chair instructed the search firm account executive to contact the sports figure and see if he might consider exploring the CEO position.
After some persuasion the sports figure agreed to pursue the position. In spite of a lack of background in human services or nonprofit management he was hired within a few weeks.

**Midwestern Arts Center (MAC)**

Midwestern Arts Center began operation in the mid-1950’s to capitalize on newly evolving methods of communication and technology as avenues for public art awareness. Its list of accomplishments is long and varied, having won numerous national awards. Its board of directors consists of two dozen individuals who are senior executives in major corporations, senior partners in professional firms, and experienced, highly sought-after community volunteers.

In the spring of 2001 the president and CEO of Midwestern Art Center announced his retirement after a twenty-three year tenure, almost half of the Center’s successful history. A newspaper account noted that the retiring CEO was co-chairing the search for his successor with the then board chair, a veteran of a number of major nonprofit boards in the metropolitan area. A large international firm headquartered in another part of the country had been engaged to carry out the search. Within several months it became public that there were three final candidates, from three states outside of the metropolitan area. Two local candidates, including one internal to MAC, were reported to be out of the running.

Finally, an out-of-state candidate not among those listed at the time of this article was selected for the job. He became CEO of Midwest Art Center and his predecessor
was named president *emeritus*, with an office at the Center and some duties performed at the discretion of the new CEO.

**Interagency Analysis**

The four individual cases were examined relative to four themes: circumstances precipitating the CEO’s departure, the process of the search for a successor, the selection itself and the transition period. Staff fulfilling comparable roles in the organizations had similar perspectives more often than not.

**Why CEOs left.** Among the accounts of the three former CEOs available to be interviewed, including the one who had served for only a year, a striking similarity was their sense of pride in what had been accomplished during their tenures. The three all articulated their own thought process for leaving the job and all saw themselves as making the decision to leave on their own. This is in contrast to the board members leading the search. In two of the three cases they felt that the decision for the former CEO to move on was at least partly the board’s, although in each case it was carried out through discussion rather than termination. The other principals felt that the reasons their CEOs left were straightforward, with the exception of one senior staff member who had a suspicion that the CEO’s leaving was not entirely voluntary.

**Conducting the search.** All three former CEOs felt that their respective boards had done a good job of the search and selection of their successors and all expressed satisfaction with the person who had taken over. An interesting point of commonality among the new CEOs is that none of them applied for the job before being recruited and, in at least two of the cases, the courtship on the part of the search committee chair was relatively
intense. Two of the senior staff members felt that money spent on a search firm was wasted, but all of the senior staff felt that staff in general received appropriate amounts of information during the search and that there had been at least some staff input during the process.

**Selection.** Virtually all parties were satisfied with the candidate ultimately selected to lead the respective organizations, although one senior staff member recalls a very poor first impression of the new CEO and his concern that the board had chosen badly. By the time of the interview he had become an enthusiastic supporter of the new CEO. One of the senior staff members had been a candidate for the CEO position and was not selected. It is a tribute to the board’s handling of the matter that he is a strong advocate for the CEO actually selected and correctly and happily views himself as critical to the new person’s success.

A finding of great interest regarding selection was the high degree of investment of search committee chairs (most of whom were also or later became board chairs) in the process. Each of them became extremely convinced of which individual should be selected and each managed to lead his committee and fellow board members to unanimous support of his choice. Each described how they thought about and then took intentional steps to be certain that the new CEO would feel a strong call from the board and that the board would share ownership of the decision. The uninvolved board members’ accounts of their knowledge of the process and their confidence in the search committees were positive in all cases.
Transition. The characteristics of the periods after a new CEO was in place varied in the four cases, ranging from smooth and almost seamless to quite difficult and prolonged. The fact of having senior staff in place who could lead and direct daily activities was significant in the cases in which the transition proceeded most easily. In all cases board members expressed relief at the successful installation of new executive leadership and seemed eager to move out of the more active board role required during the process of search and selection.

Discussion and Recommendations

Given the limited number of cases investigated there are serious limitations to this study with regard to generalizability. Not only is the sample size numerically small, but it also represents only four examples of specific nonprofit organizations at specific points in their organizational development. Given the diversity along all dimensions of agencies within the nonprofit sector caution must be exercised in drawing any firm conclusions from this exploratory study.

The findings suggest, however, that boards of directors do in fact manage to assume the active leadership role when even very assertive nonprofit executives must be replaced in a nonprofit organization. In each of the four cases it was evident that the board of directors recognized its duty to search for and hire a new CEO and did not rely on the sitting CEO to take the initiative in the process. In two instances, as noted above, there is evidence that the board actually propelled the sitting CEO’s decision about the need to move on prior to the CEO’s decision to do so.
Regarding the four assumptions made at the outset of the study to guide the work, the first was that the division of task responsibility between board and CEO in nonprofit organizations is variable depending on what is happening in the organization. While this was tested only around executive transition it seemed, in these instances, to be true. Prior to transition the CEO in each of the organizations studied seemed to set the agenda and act as the catalyst for most organizational activity. Once the transition was underway the board, at least those members responsible for replacement of the CEO, clearly became the organizational leaders.

The second assumption was similar to the first, stating that board behavior changes during CEO transition. It was clear that this was so in these cases. All four boards seemed to understand quickly that they needed to design and follow a process for selection which allowed them to act independently of the departing CEO, even though all departing CEOs had been strong leaders of their respective boards prior to transition becoming an issue. In the three cases where it was possible all departing CEOs had some role in selection, but, while they may have felt they had a significant say it was clear that the boards claimed the decision fully as their own.

The third assumption was that the organization’s position in the developmental life cycle would impact how boards of directors carried out the duty of CEO recruitment and selection. This did not seem to be the case in these four examples. There were some cosmetic differences in the processes in each of the four organizations, but they seemed to be based more on size and complexity of the organization and on the circumstances causing the sitting CEO to depart, rather than on life cycle placement.
The fourth assumption was that first person accounts from the principals involved in nonprofit CEO selection would be the most accurate sources of information available about how the process actually moves forward. This would seem to be the case. As the literature suggests, CEO replacement is a sensitive and delicate matter, normally carried out, for good reason, under a “veil of secrecy” (Vancil, 1987). Accounts from memory about a sensitive subject have certain built-in flaws, but triangulation across accounts seems to have, in each case, provided a relatively comprehensive picture, not available in any other manner, of nonprofit CEO success in four well-established organizations.

Implications of Findings and Recommendations for Practice and Future Research

The findings from this study lead to a variety of implications for practice and for additional research on executive transition the nonprofit sector. While all of the cases examined here shared certain characteristics in terms of process and chronology it was clear that much more nebulous factors played major roles in the way CEO recruitment, selection and transition proceeded. The personalities and work styles of board and search committee chairs seemed to significantly influence the degree of openness and inclusivity of the process. The fact that each of the search processes was headed by the sitting or soon-to-be board chair signified the understanding of the degree of importance which nonprofits attach to CEO selection.

For practice, these conclusions would lead nonprofit organizations, when considering individuals for board membership, or when advancing board members into leadership roles, to give adequate attention to personal characteristics and work styles, in addition to professional credentials and community connections. The importance of these
intangibles is also clearly relevant in the manner in which the board chair and organization CEO work with one another, regardless of personal differences in style that they may exhibit.

There are also implications for orientation and training of board members. CEO transition may be a phenomenon that occurs so rarely that directors have no tradition of carrying out the roles of selection and hiring. The necessity of carrying out this role, however, may occur unexpectedly at any time in a nonprofit’s history, so full awareness of its critical importance should be made clear to new board members.

Studying one example in which CEO transition was occasioned by serious malfeasance on the part of the CEO, undetected by directors until it was reported in the newspaper, also focused attention on the need for boards of directors to assure that a plan for crisis management is in place, and that it can be carried out without leadership of the CEO. This type of issue will be particularly interesting as the fall-out from early twenty-first century corporate scandals proceeds. It will be important to watch the impact of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (The American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002) on nonprofit organizations.

Perhaps more difficult to deal with than the transition process itself is the situation in which boards must initiate a CEO transition. While this presents one kind of challenge if a CEO is clearly inadequate in the job, it is arguably even more difficult when the situation is less clear-cut, but a critical mass of board members senses that a change would be in the best interests of the nonprofit and its mission. This would underscore the importance of boards of directors conducting regular performance evaluation of the CEO and tying that evaluation to the organization’s strategic plan.
Clear programmatic direction provided in a plan and regular and specific feedback provided by the board leadership, on behalf of the full board, to the nonprofit CEO can create the basis for board decision-making and prepare a way to deal with CEO change when necessary and when the CEO does not initiate the change.

The critical nature of the board role in CEO transition and the fact that each of the four organizations studied managed it well regardless of life cycle stage would further suggest that new organizations might prevent early disaster and perhaps even jumpstart their efforts by attempting to recruit experienced board members from the very beginning, rather than limiting themselves to those who are driven simply by passion and deep commitment to a particular cause. Additional practice implications involve succession planning at both board and staff levels. The nonprofit organizations studied here, even when very strong individuals were in place as board chairs and CEOs, also had enough diffusion of leadership that the absence of a CEO or the rotation of board officers did not seem seriously to weaken the organizations. While the nonprofit CEO is assumed to be the point of contact between staff and board, the fact that each organization had senior staff in place who were able to tend to day-to-day operations and communicate with the board appropriately during the CEO transition seemed critical.

Each of these practice implications also can be interpreted as informing the curricula of the variety of nonprofit management and training programs that now exist. Such programs run the gamut from brief one-time-only workshops to full-scale graduate degree programs and they view as audiences current board and staff of nonprofit organizations as well as those full-time or part-time students preparing to enter the nonprofit sector either as volunteers or professionals. Implications for training and
education, such as the inclusion of techniques for board selection and training, for CEO performance evaluation, and for crisis management can be envisioned at all levels.

This exploratory study suggests a wide variety of questions for further research. While no specific correlation was found here between phase of organizational life cycle and nature of the CEO transition process this issue deserves more exploration across a much wider sample of nonprofit organizations. Such investigation is made more difficult by the lack of unanimity about how to categorize organizations. For example the one organization studied here that was run by the founding director was in some ways much more highly evolved than an older agency which had a limited mission and few resources. The matter of replacement of a CEO founder has its own set of dynamics worthy of further study, although there already is some literature on this topic. In terms of life cycle theory itself, the idea that parts of an organization, for example, its governance structure, may evolve at different speeds and in different ways than other parts should be examined in order to refine the utility of that construct for describing and diagnosing organizations.

Noting that most differences in how the transitions observed here played out seemed to involve the circumstances under which sitting CEOs were leaving, a study designed to look more deeply into those differences would be revealing. The matter of how board leaders decide that they must initiate a CEO change is an aspect of transition that could shed light on the ways in which boards carry out other functions. The dependence of boards on CEOs for information about organizational operations, suggested in both the nonprofit and business literature, also has bearing not only on CEO
transition, but on the carrying out of other board responsibilities. Again, Sarbanes-Oxley Act implications for nonprofit organizations will be interesting.

The literature review for this study suggested that there are some similarities between CEO transition in the for profit and nonprofit sectors of American society. It was clear that there are also striking differences, such as the composition itself of boards of directors in the two sectors. These differences imply that the applicability of lessons learned in one sector to another may be less than sometimes argued. Applying a for profit template to nonprofit challenges is often suggested as a route to increased efficiency and effectiveness of the nonprofit sector. But this may or may not lead to appropriate solutions for organizations driven by social missions rather than by much more easily measured corporate earnings, but this needs further exploration.

Just as the differences in CEO transition in the for profit and nonprofit sectors deserve more study, there may also be significant unexplored differences within the nonprofit sector based on several dimensions. Do arts organizations and social service nonprofits approach CEO transition differently? Do large and small organizations, either because of amount of resources or organizational culture approach this in different ways? How does the board composition affect the transition process? Some nonprofit boards are composed of a majority of other nonprofit executives, who may approach the matter in ways other than those pursued by boards composed of corporate executives, or yet again, primarily community volunteers.

This study was undertaken primarily to examine the role of boards of directors during CEO transition. Deeper plumbing of other aspects of nonprofit agency functioning during CEO transition would be of interest. Day-to-day task
accomplishment, effect on clients or patrons, employee morale, ability to raise funds, relationships with regulatory or contracting entities, community perception would all present different facets of nonprofit CEO transition.

Several questions arise regarding the reasons nonprofit CEOs leave their jobs. Illness and incarceration were two dramatic catalysts encountered in this study. While there is some assertion in the literature that more CEO transition involves extenuating circumstances than simple decisions to move to another job, this matter in itself raises additional questions. Is CEO transition different when the next plan for the CEO is retirement rather than a new job? When and how do CEOs decide for themselves that the time is right for a change?

In two of the cases examined here there was an internal candidate seriously interested in the CEO job, although others became at least de facto interim CEOs. One of the internal candidates, neither of whom was selected, stayed on to work successfully with the new CEO. The other left the organization. Here there are questions not only of internal versus external candidates for the job of nonprofit CEO, but also about the power and influence of senior staff in nonprofit organizations.

Finally, given the importance of healthy functioning of the nonprofit sector, it would be useful to know more about situations in which the board of directors is less able than the examples studied here to conduct a successful transition or in which a board should identify and act on a need to change CEO and fails to do so. The public’s stake in the success of the nonprofit sector carrying out its work should act as an incentive for scholars to strive to overcome the challenges of research in these areas.
\textsuperscript{1}Names and identifying information regarding organization were masked to protect confidentiality.
Bibliography


